David Gold
As we have seen in just the past few years, fossil fuel prices can vary
dramatically over very short periods of time. Creating greater
certainty regarding steady increases in fossil fuel prices over the
coming decade would have an enormous impact on private sector
investments in both alternative energy and energy efficiency. Cap
and
trade is the right debate to be having because it focuses the
discussion on how to change the fundamental economics of fossil-based
energy. But ultimately cap and trade is the wrong solution;
superior
means exist to achieve the results we need not only for the environment
but also for national security and our economy. A better solution
is a
strategically targeted
“ceiling” tax on carbon combined with a
tax
dividend.

Cap and trade sounds good on the surface. Seemingly
it would allow
the market the freedom to choose among implementing technologies that
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, paying to use existing technologies
that emit greenhouse gases, or paying for offsets from another
entity.
But cap and trade is inherently flawed in its complexity and the slow
rate at which it can propel change. The potential for loopholes
and
corruption,
both through the specifics of how the law is implemented and the
trading markets that will be created, are enormous. If you have
read
my blog previously, you may be surprised to hear me come out against a
seemingly market-based solution like cap and trade. Many assume
that
because cap and trade worked for acid rain, it will work for greenhouse
gases. But for markets to work well there needs to be
transparency
around both price and what actually is being purchased. As the
graphics
shown
help illustrate, the complexity of greenhouse gases are enormous
compared to the simplicity of sulfur emissions from coal plants. The
challenges around accurate and transparent accounting of how much
carbon is emitted or “re-sequestered” through an offset is fairly
daunting. There have already been
significant
challenges
around carbon offsets with the European cap and trade
efforts. So far in Europe, the impact on greenhouse gas emissions
has been
much
less
than desired (for additional reading see the

upcoming
book
by
Roger Pielke).
Because of these factors, not only does cap and trade create risk of
corruption because of the challenges around defining exactly what has
been emitted or how much an offset has recaptured, but its ability to
actually achieve the desired reduction in greenhouse gases also
falls into question.

Efforts to implement a cap and trade
system that would be truly
comprehensive would treat all long-lived greenhouse gases as equal. To
make any meaningful difference, the price of carbon must be set high
enough to move the meter significantly on the cost of fossil fuels.
Many
experts estimate that price to be
as
much
as ten times
the current price in Europe. As a result, if a cap and trade
system is
actually going to result in a meaningful reduction in greenhouse gas it
will have an enormous impact on the economy given the scope of
activities that generate greenhouse gases. In addition, the sheer
process of requiring businesses to account for their emissions would
lead to significant wasteful administrative costs beyond the cost of
the carbon emissions themselves. Such a requirement would,
however,
create a great jobs program for accountants, attorneys and even
investment bankers who would get paid to navigate the complicated mess
that would result. This reality is why many cap and trade
proposals
end up being limited to areas of highly concentrated emissions that are
easy to track. This effectively means
focusing
on
power plants, which represent about 39% of the impact-weighted
greenhouse gas emissions (of which 85% is from coal-fired
plants). And most
proposals
generally leave transportation -- which produces about 33% of the
impact-weighted U.S. greenhouse gases – largely unaffected.

“So what?” you say. Let’s focus on reducing
the 39% that is
largely from coal-fired plants, right? From an environmental
perspective it does not matter where we reduce emissions – just that
they are reduced. But from an economic and national security
standpoint it matters significantly. The U.S.
is home to
roughly 25% of the world’s coal and supplies virtually all the coal
Americans consume. Meanwhile, the U.S.
imports
the
majority
of petroleum that we consume. Reducing consumption of coal will
not
strengthen our national security, and the most immediate effect on our
economy will be negative. Even if one doesn’t believe those are
important factors (hard for me to fathom but I know some feel that
way), I suspect that everyone would agree that the political ability to
implement
something that moves the meter is critical. A
policy
that appeals to the left and right of the political spectrum holds the
best promise.
Tax
and
dividend,
whereby a tax is placed on carbon and some, if not all, of the proceeds
are distributed back to those who paid the tax, is a concept that has
begun to receive discussion as a potential alternate solution.
Such a
system taxes based on consumption but the dividends are paid out
without
respect to specific consumption. So, the motivation to move to
alternative fuels or implement energy efficiency remains because the
dividend will still be received even if tax payment is reduced.
Yet,
the sting of the tax is reduced by receipt of the dividend. Tax
and
dividend eliminates many of the problems associated with the complexity
and lack of transparency with cap and trade and it largely leverages
systems already in place to tax things like gasoline, coal, etc.
However, it still is flawed in that it treats all carbon as being
equal. Again, while all emitted CO2 is equal from an
environmental
standpoint, it is not from an economic or national security
standpoint. In addition, the greater the scope of the tax, the
more
interest groups it will upset and the less likely it is that it can
ever pass Congress to become law.
The better solution, both
from an efficacy and political
standpoint, than cap and trade or tax and divided is a strategically
placed “
ceiling” tax on carbon combined with
a tax
dividend.
Our greatest opportunity lies at the nexus where greenhouse gases are
reduced, national security is strengthened and our economy is at least
not harmed. As a result, the first element of the solution should
focus on petroleum consumption, which is predominantly consumed in
vehicles and the first strategic place for a
“ceiling” tax is
on CO2 emissions from fossil-based transportation fuels used in
automobiles and trucks. This is effectively a gas tax, except it
would
apply to gasoline, diesel and any future form of fossil-based fuel sold
for ground transportation and would be based on the amount of
non-renewable CO2 emitted upon combustion. In addition, the tax
rate
would be determined by the difference between the price the
retailer/vendor pays for the fuel and a pre-determined fixed maximum
charge to the consumer (individuals and businesses alike). If the
ambient price of the fuel commodity increases, the tax that is charged
would decrease. Thus, it creates a “ceiling” on the tax where
there is
an ambient price at which the tax would no longer be charged.
Implementing the tax in this manner accomplishes several objectives:
- It creates clarity, certainty and stability around the price that
alternatives will need to compete with.
- It sends a clear political message that this tax is not forever;
it
has a built-in mechanism to end when the ambient market price catches
up with the artificial price created by the tax.
- It puts a limit on the pain inflicted at the pump. If fuel
prices
spike, the tax will diminish and even go to zero if the maximum charge
to consumers is exceeded.
Now, what
to do with the revenue? We must ensure that the negative impact
on our
economy is minimized as much possible. In addition, we have to be
realistic and create something that can fly politically. As a
result,
the tax revenue should be sent right back to the consumers who paid
it. For individuals, the amount received could be based on the
size of
the family to reflect the likely increased transportation needs.
Economically speaking, the dollars received by each family will
be
much more meaningful to a low-income family. Yet, the payment is
not
based on income – something for Democrats and Republicans to
celebrate. For businesses, we must endeavor to avoid making
specific
businesses non-competitive. If a business has a transportation
intensive business, the cost increase could be substantial. So,
distribution to companies could be based on their fuel consumption for
transportation over a multi-year period prior to enactment of the
tax.
That way, transportation-intensive companies will receive a much larger
share than those that use little transportation directly in their
business.
What
about the impact on the oil industry? No doubt that such a tax
would
have an impact on oil consumption and therefore production. It
may
even be politically required to dividend some of the tax proceeds back
to the oil industry. After all, democracy is the art of the
possible. This would likely mean a smaller oil industry to the
extent
that the industry doesn’t redirect its efforts to other profitable
business efforts (e.g., geothermal, solar, etc.). However, with a
tax
on transportation fuels, there would be a clear economic upside to the
change. The clarity provided with respect to future prices of
gasoline
and diesel would provide significant impetus and support for private
sector investments in renewables as well as vehicle energy
efficiency.
In addition, such clarity would spur significant economic growth in the
automotive industry as consumers become eager to find energy efficient
or alternative energy vehicles. One need only look at what happened
with the
sales
of
hybrid vehicles
when gas prices spiked a few years ago. The auto industry would see a
boom as consumers looked to switch to vehicles that consume less fossil
fuels.
President Obama’s
desired
goal
is a 17% reduction by 2020 from 2005 emission levels. If the tax
is
set at a high enough level, studies indicate it would drive significant
change in buying decisions and driving behavior of consumers. A
key to
the success of the tax is that it creates
long-term certainty
with consumers regarding the likely price of gasoline and diesel.
A
Congressional
Budget
Office Study found that a 10%
long-term
increase in fuel prices would result in roughly a 4% reduction in fuel
consumption (through a combination of reduced driving as well as
purchase of different vehicles).

If the ceiling tax were set based on a target price of $5 per gallon
retail price for gasoline, this would create
long term
visibility into a price increase and would imply we could see a
reduction in fuel consumption (and corresponding emissions) of 40%-50%
representing a 13%-17% reduction in overall greenhouse gas
emissions.
The U.S. consumes more than
6x
the
gasoline per capital
than Europe and one reason is that gasoline costs 2-3x as much at the
pump than the U.S. What the CBO study did not take into account
(given
the challenge of doing so) is what happens to petroleum consumption
when alternative fuel vehicles then become cost-competitive. I
would
suggest that the accelerated innovation that would occur in such
vehicles once businesses knew they would be competing with a $5/gallon
price would drive even greater reductions in greenhouse gas emissions
and petroleum consumption well beyond 17% in 10 years.
Clearly,
such reductions are much less meaningful from an environmental
perspective if carbon emissions elsewhere were to increase. Given
that
electric vehicles are a probable future for some vehicles, we must
address the emissions created by electricity production.
Otherwise, we
will simply push CO2 creation from the tailpipe to the smokestack.
But
rather than a complex loophole- and scandal-fraught cap and trade
system, a strategically placed ceiling tax on CO2 emissions and
corresponding dividend should also be used in the utility industry.
The challenge here is that just like cap and trade, in order to
have a
meaningful impact regarding the business decisions made on utility
plants, the price of carbon must be set fairly high. Because
electricity costs impact every person and business in the nation, a
carbon tax applied to power plants significant enough to be meaningful
would have a broad-based negative impact on the economy.
Everything
would become more expensive.
Instead
of a blanket tax, the ceiling tax on CO2 from electricity production
should be much more strategic. First, the tax placed on existing
plants should be fairly modest and intended primarily to generate tax
revenue that would be utilized specifically to provide funding to the
coal industry for clean coal and sequestration technologies. That
is
not only the politically correct move; it is economically smart given
our vast coal resources. A tax of just $2 per million metric tons
of
carbon would generate roughly $5 billion a year in tax revenue (U.S.
utilities
generate
roughly 2,400 million metric tons per year). Yet, it would add an
average of about one tenth of a cent to the cost of every kilowatt-hour
(U.S.
total
electricity
production
is roughly 4,100 billion kilowatt hours per year) or roughly a .01%
increase in retail price. Second, the tax on new plants
built after a
couple-year grace period for those already being constructed, should be
set at a much higher level that ramps up over time to a capped amount.
An initial tax rate of roughly $30 per metric ton would equate into a
cost increase of about 3 cents per kilowatt-hour for the worst
offending coal-powered electricity generation. However, the
specific
amount of the tax should also vary based on the price of the underlying
commodity (e.g., coal or natural gas). That way, if there were a
spike
in a commodity price (like with natural gas a few years ago), the tax
is automatically reduced or eliminated, thereby eliminating excessive
spikes in electricity prices.
To
make a carbon tax on utilities achieve the desired goal of driving a
change in decisions regarding which type of plants to build, it is
critical that utilities are
not allowed to work the tax into
their rate base - they must eat the tax cost or implement new plants
that emit less or no CO2. In addition, when plants reach a set
timeframe after the end of their depreciation period, they would begin
to be subject to the higher tax on new plants. The incentive must
be
squarely placed on utilities to implement low carbon or no carbon means
– all of which they
can work into their rate base. That
means
implementing renewable, nuclear, sequestration and likely some
additional natural gas. Given that the incremental plants will,
by and
large, create more expensive electricity than the base coal plants,
utilities will have increased incentives to promote energy efficiency
and implement the smart grid. Until technology innovation
allows
otherwise, most incremental electricity load above the current base
will likely cost more to deliver. Such a tax, if set high enough
on
new plants, would likely create something akin to a cap on any
increases in carbon emissions by utilities. As aging plants are
replaced or retrofitted, reductions in emissions would
begin. In 10
years, if the vast majority of new electricity production beyond what
was currently being built has been low- or no carbon and if just 15% of
aging coal plants are replaced with low or no-carbon emitting
alternatives, we would see a reduction from 2005 utility emissions of
3%-6% on top of the at least 13%-17% reductions from action on
transportation fuels but without a severe negative impact on the
economy. And the clean coal and sequestration technologies
developed
from the R&D generated through the taxes would hopefully enable an
acceleration in reductions as they are able to be implemented in the
following years.
In making decisions about how to reduce green house gas
emissions, as
a nation we cannot and should not focus solely on the issue of global
warming while ignoring the equally important goals of maintaining our
national security and economic strength. We must implement a
system
that changes the economics of energy in a way that supports all of
these goals. Not only will cap and trade be unable to achieve
these
three goals, but without an extremely high price on carbon that likely
cripples our economy it won’t even have a significant impact on the
single goal of reducing green house gas emissions. A system that
does
not focus first on our consumption of petroleum has little chance of
strengthening our economy or national security. In addition, to
be
successful, we must create greater clarity over long-term fuel price
that the alternatives must compete with in order to provide the impetus
for private sector investment in energy efficiency and alternative
energy. Cap and trade cannot give this clarity and the government
cannot simply buy our way out of this problem. We must have the
innovation, creativity and financial power of the private sector
motivated to making the scale of change that is required. A
strategically targeted ceiling tax on carbon with focused use of the
dividends could create the log term clarity needed in the market and
will motivate the private sector to dramatically increase investment in
the type of innovation and change that is the source of ours (and the
world’s) prosperity.
David Gold is an entrepreneur and engineer with national public
policy
experience who heads up cleantech investments for Access Venture
Partners (www.accessvp.com).
This
article
was first published on his blog, www.greengoldblog.com.